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The Constitutional Court subscribes to a standard of "deference" in judicial review.1 
The principle of deference concerns the function of the judge in mediating between 
the law and legislative and executive politics. The principle recognises the need to 
protect the institutional character of each of the three arms of government in a manner 
that will prevent their ability to discharge their constitutional role being undermined.2 
O'Regan frames this vision as follows:3  
The role of the courts under our Constitution is to protect the Constitution, and in 
particular individual fundamental rights. At times, in asserting this function, courts 
will have to intrude to some extent on the terrain of the legislature and the executive. 
In doing so, however, it is clear from the jurisprudence that is emerging that courts 
must remain sensitive to the legitimate constitutional interests of the other arms of 
government and seek to ensure that the manner of their intrusion, while protecting 
fundamental rights, intrudes as little as possible in the terrain of the executive and 
the legislature. 
This defence of the theory of judicial interpretation employed seems to encourage 
judges to limit the exercise of their own power, and go to great lengths to defer to 
the legislature and the executive. Therefore, the theory of judicial deference, as 
employed by the courts, increasingly sounds like judicial restraint. Is this theory of 
judicial review employed by the courts suitable for the current politico-legal landscape 
of the South African constitutional state? Pieterse argues:4 
Given the executive's stranglehold over the legislature, citizens increasingly look to 
the judiciary to ensure accountability and for the protection of their basic interest. 
Today, the judiciary acts both as watchdog over the other branches' adherence to 
the doctrine of separation of powers and as primary protector of citizens' rights within 
its confines. In South Africa, as elsewhere, this reality has been underscored by the 
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1  O'Regan 2005 PER/PELJ 132. 
2  South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 1 SA 883 (CC). 
3  O'Regan 2005 PER/PELJ 132. 
4  Pieterse 2004 SAJHR 383. 
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introduction of a justiciable Bill of Rights, which "fundamentally changed the place of 
the judiciary in South Africa's constitutional and political order". 
The dominance of the executive over Parliament means that at all three levels of 
government there are few effective checks and balances on the abuse of power by 
the executive. The deployment policy of the ANC speaks in a language that is 
unapologetically Leninist, calling for the placement of "cadres" in key positions in 
national, provincial, local government and the public sector, even the independent 
Chapter 9 institutions, with the aim of bringing these institutions under its control.5 
According to documents of the ruling party, the transformation of the state entails, 
primarily:6 
Extending the power of the National Liberation Movement (NLM) over all levers of 
power: the army, the police, the bureaucracy, intelligence structures, the judiciary, 
parastatals, and agencies such as regulatory bodies, the public broadcaster, the 
central bank and so on. 
The ruling party claims social control over all levels of powers within the South African 
constitutional state. It can be argued that the document envisages the thought that 
the principle of majority decision-making is constrained by respect for the rights of 
individuals and minorities, a tendency embedded in national liberation thought, which 
equates majoritarianism with democracy.7 This train of thought allows liberation 
movements to use their domination of the political arena in a manner which belies 
their commitment to a constitutional democracy by shifting the balance of powers in 
favour of the executive, justifying such actions by reference to their possession of a 
majority in Parliament.8 The strategy employed by the ruling party is deeply at odds 
with the notions of the separation of powers and constitutional supremacy as 
embedded in the Constitution. 
McLean states that this means that the traditional separation of powers between the 
three branches of government is effectively found only between the courts on the one 
hand and the executive and legislature on the other. In the absence of robust checks 
                                        
5  Roux Politics of Principle 181. 
6  ANC 1998 https://amadlandawonye.wikispaces.com/1998,+ANC,+State,+Property+Relations,+ 
Social+Transformation. 
7  Southall 2014 Africa Spectrum 86. 
8  Southall 2014 Africa Spectrum 86. 
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and balances elsewhere, courts should respond, not by adopting a deferential position, 
but by ensuring that the other branches of government are held accountable to it and 
the Constitution.9 This work investigates the theory of judicial review employed by the 
courts against the context of the public litigation where it is utilised. 
Section 2 of this work investigates the concept, characteristics and benefits of public 
litigation. Around the world, litigation or judicial review has become immensely popular 
as a treatment for the pains of modern governance.10 South Africa is no exception to 
this phenomenon.11 This activism by litigation consists of efforts to promote, impede, 
or direct social, political, economic, or environmental change, or stasis.12 The question 
is asked; can the concept of public litigation offer assistance in shaping and influencing 
the theory of judicial review employed by the courts?  
In Section 3 the application of the theory of deference as employed by the courts is 
discussed. The Constitution opted for a model of the relationship between the 
legislature and executive modelled more closely on the Westminster system than on 
the presidential system found in France and the United States.13 Unfortunately, this 
weakens the ability of Parliament to function as an effective check on the abuse of 
power by the executive. It is argued that, given the fusion between the executive and 
the legislature in South Africa14 and the overconcentration of executive power in the 
legislature,15 the concept of deference in judicial review falls short of finding the 
correct balance between the constitutional values of participation, openness, 
justification and accountability.  
Section 4 of the work explores the culture of justification articulated by Davis as a 
coherent theory of judicial review set against the backdrop of public litigation. 
                                        
9  McLean Constitutional Deference 209. 
10  Hertogh & Halliday Judicial review and bureaucratic impact in future research 15. 
11  Hoexter Administrative Law 104. 
12  Schokman, Creasey and Mohen Short Guide 3. 
13  O'Regan 2005 PER/PELJ 125. 
14  Labuschagne 2011 Politeia 2; Choudhry 2009 CCR 11; Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer 2001 
Democratization 44-45. 
15 Malan 2014 PER/PELJ 1968-1969; Roux Politics of Principle 167-168. 
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2 Public litigation 
Scholars have disagreed about the defining features of public litigation, a term often 
used to refer to the diverse proceedings of modern, non-traditional litigation.16 The 
term public litigation is used in this work to refer to lawsuits challenging legislative or 
executive action, seeking policy changes within government, and seeking to 
restructure the organisation of public institutions or expose corruption. A focal point 
for public litigation in this sense is that the legislator or the executive will always be a 
party to the proceedings. Although public litigation is typically brought following 
specific violations of constitutional rights, values or obligations, the aim is not redress 
for past damages. Contrary to the traditional plaintiffs of the South African common 
law, litigants use public litigation to rectify constitutional violations not easily definable 
in terms of personal, financial loss or other damages claimable at common law. Public 
litigation therefore allows for participation in the political decision-making process for 
individuals, minorities and groups that are politically marginalised. 
Although the motives for the litigation vary, litigants may seek to reform the 
institutional structure from which constitutional violations arose and from which similar 
wrongs may arise again. In this sense, public litigation, or activism by litigation, 
presents a new means of policymaking not found in any civics books.17 Activists are 
then able, through the legal process, and by using the courts, to influence government 
decisions and advance their own interests. Organisations and individuals often 
disregard or distrust the political process and approach the courts to advance their 
own interest and to protect their own rights,18 or to correct constitutional violations 
where political means have failed. 
Schokman states that the organisation or individual takes on a legal case as part of a 
strategy to achieve broader systemic change. The case may create change either 
                                        
16  Traditional litigation refers to the common law principles of litigation as defined in Ferreira v Levin 
1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 229. Litigation is instituted to claim for damages, to correct a wrong or 
to obtain relief from another. The traditional cause of action featured a plaintiff with clear and 
identifiable rights and the defendant with clear obligations or liabilities. In terms of the common 
law, the litigants would pray for a remedy that would usually involve monetary compensation, and 
the effect of the remedy would rarely reach beyond the parties to the case. 
17  Boyer 1999 New Yorker 54. 
18  Ranchod 2007 Policy 3. 
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through the success of the action and its impact on law, policy or practice, or by 
publicly exposing injustice, raising awareness and generating broader change.19  
Litigants seek to enforce constitutional principles and values that affect others as 
directly as they themselves and that are valued for moral or political reasons and are 
independent of economic interests. Litigants therefore seek to regulate executive and 
legislative action in accordance with the Constitution. The relief claimed aims to 
restructure the public organisation or conduct by the legislature and/or executive to 
eliminate a threat to the principles and values enshrined in the Constitution.20  
In Ferreira v Levin,21 Justice O'Regan investigated the concept of public litigation.22 
She stated that in litigation of a public character the relief sought is generally forward-
looking and general in its application, so that it may directly affect a wide range of 
people. In addition, the harm alleged may often be quite diffuse or amorphous. 
Because the alleged harm is often nondescript, the motive behind public litigation is 
often difficult to determine. This allows for the misuse of the court process by 
individuals, groups, political parties and the state. Litigants abusing the court process 
are able to frustrate or delay legitimate administrative action or attempt to gain 
political mileage from the litigation. 
In Ngxuza v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape,23 the Court 
held as follows:24 
The principle of legality implies that public bodies must be kept within their powers. 
There should, in general, be no reason why individual harm should be required in 
addition to the public interest of the general community. Public law litigation may 
also differ from traditional litigation between individuals in a number of respects. A 
wide range of persons may be affected by the case. The emphasis will often not only 
be backward looking, in the sense of redressing past wrongs, but also forward-
                                        
19  Schokman, Creasey and Mohen Short Guide 3. 
20  Fallon 1984 NYU L Rev 3-5 have been consulted and adapted to fit South African circumstances in 
drafting this paragraph. 
21  Ferreira v Levin 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 229. 
22  Ferreira v Levin 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 229. 
23  Ngxuza v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2001 2 SA 609 (E). 
24  Ngxuza v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2001 2 SA 609 (E) paras 
619C-D. 
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looking, to ensure that the future exercise of public power is in accordance with the 
principle of legality. 
The fact that a wide range of individuals may be affected by the outcome of the case 
is problematic. People may be affected without any input in the case. Therefore, 
because a wide range of people are affected by the litigation and the possibility of 
abuse of the process exists, an expansive theory of judicial review is called for. This 
expansive theory should be based on the founding provisions of the Constitution.25 
This allows the court to query whether an order made by the court will achieve or 
advance the values of human dignity, equality, human rights, the supremacy of the 
Constitution and the rule of law and the democracy of government, including 
accountability, responsiveness and openness. 
The function of the judge in public litigation may also differ from his or her position in 
private litigation. In private litigation the judge will usually not be involved in the case 
after granting of the order. In public litigation the judge may stay involved in the 
proceedings after the final order is granted. Although South African courts were 
initially reluctant to grant supervisory orders or structural interdicts,26 the courts have 
more recently granted supervisory orders in several cases.27 In public litigation the 
judge is active, with the responsibility not only for credible fact assessment but also 
for organising and shaping the litigation to ensure a just and viable outcome.28 The 
fact that the judge is active in shaping the litigation and stays involved after ruling on 
the matter rules out a formalistic approach to constitutional interpretation. Public 
litigation then is a space of possibility, with the protection and advancement of the 
Constitution the goal. 
                                        
25  Section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). 
26  Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 6 SA 40 
(SCA). 
27  Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC); Nyathi 
v Department of Health, Gauteng 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); Sibiya v The Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Johannesburg 2005 5 SA 315 (CC). 
28  Director of Public Prosecutions v Minister of Constitutional Development 2009 4 SA 222 (CC). Here 
the Court called for information as the first step in the supervisory process and ordered the Director 
General of the Department of Justice to submit a report to the Court with detailed  information 
relating to the matter. 
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The concept of South African public litigation conforms with the investigation of 
American public litigation conducted by Chayes.29 Chayes in his investigation of public 
law litigation finds as follows:30 
In public law litigation, then, fact-finding is principally concerned with "legislative" 
rather than "adjudicative" fact. In addition, "fact evaluation" is perhaps a more 
accurate term than "fact finding." The whole process begins to look like the traditional 
description of legislation: Attention is drawn to a "mischief," existing or threatened, 
and the activity of the parties and court is directed to the development of on-going 
measures designed to cure that mischief. Indeed, if, as is often the case, the decree 
sets up an affirmative regime governing the activities in controversy for the indefinite 
future and having binding force for persons within its ambit, then it is not very much 
of a stretch to see it as, pro tanto, a legislative act. 
Public litigation in South Africa can lead to the same result where directed at litigation 
regarding the constitutionality or interpretation of legislation. Where the area of 
contention is decisions made by officials, which are administratively or legally 
unsound, an order of the Court may have the effect of realigning the offending 
decision with the Constitution. 
Public litigation allows for the measuring of legislation and legislative and executive 
acts against a constitutional backdrop guaranteeing the supremacy of the Constitution. 
This allows for a constitutional review that is forward looking, allowing for the scrutiny 
of possible constitutional violations before they occur. The judiciary is institutionally 
suited for this role. The Constitution is the supreme law in South Africa and any law 
or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid.31 The Constitutional Court is the highest court 
in all constitutional matters32 and makes the final decision in all constitutional 
matters.33 An order of the Constitutional Court binds all persons to whom and organs 
of the state to which it applies.34 Therefore, the Constitutional Court is the ultimate 
forum for decision-making in the South African constitutional democracy, including 
                                        
29  Chayes 1976 Harv L Rev 1282-1284, 1302. 
30  Chayes 1976 Harv L Rev 1297. 
31  Section 2 of the Constitution. 
32  Section 167(3)(a) of the Constitution. 
33  Section 167(3)(c) of the Constitution. 
34  Section 165(5) of the Constitution. 
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decisions of a political nature that fall within the scope of the Constitution. However, 
without public litigation the courts are unable to investigate constitutional violations.35 
When examining the defining characteristics of public litigation, it is clear that the 
outcomes that litigants seek correspond with one of the founding provisions of the 
Constitution, the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. The motif behind 
the litigation is therefore the protection of the public interest vested in the 
Constitution. The founding values inform the interpretation of the Constitution and 
other law, and set positive standards to which all law must comply. The founding 
values allow the courts to assist organs of the state and society to ensure 
constitutionality and effective governance. This allows the courts to build institutional 
legitimacy and play an effective role in democratic politics. The benefits of public 
litigation highlighted are many. However, should it shape and influence the theory of 
judicial review that the courts employ? The investigation of public litigation shows that 
an expansive theory of judicial review based on the founding values of the Constitution 
is called for. This rules out a formalistic constitutional interpretation of the theory of 
judicial review. 
In Glenister v President of the RSA,36 the Court found: 
In our constitutional democracy, the courts are the ultimate guardians of the 
Constitution. They not only have the right to intervene in order to prevent the 
violation of the Constitution, they also have the duty to do so. It is in the performance 
of this that courts are more likely to confront the question of whether to venture into 
the domain of other branches of government and the extent of such intervention. 
But even in these circumstances, courts must observe the limits of their power. 
Therefore, although the courts have the duty to intervene in constitutional violations, 
they have the discretion to decide when and to what extent to intervene when such a 
violation occurs within the domain of other branches of government. The decision on 
when to intervene and then to what extent will depend on the standard of judicial 
review to which the courts subscribe. It is imperative for legal certainty that litigators 
                                        
35  This is in contrast with the extensive original jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme Court in terms of 
a 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950. 
36  Glenister v President of the RSA 2009 1 SA 287 (CC) para 30. 
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and activists are aware of when the court will intervene within the sphere of other 
state institutions and when the court will defer to such institutions.  
Chayes writes that, unlike an administrative bureaucracy or a legislature, the judiciary 
must respond to the complaints of the aggrieved.37 Can the courts avoid this duty by 
electing not to intervene in a constitutional violation as it occurred within the sphere 
of another state organ? The discretion implied in the deference doctrine certainly 
suggests so. It is submitted that the legal uncertainty inherent in the deference 
doctrine is bad in law and can be avoided by subscribing to a more expansive theory 
of judicial review. 
3 Determination of the "proper standard" for judicial review 
The principle of judicial review is well established in the South African constitutional 
state. The Constitution clearly mandates the courts to review legislation or conduct 
that is inconsistent with constitutional provisions.38 Although there should be a culture 
of mutual co-operation and respect between the different branches of government,39 
the courts are mandated by constitutional provisions to ensure that the executive and 
legislature operate within the boundaries of the Constitution.  
In seeking to develop an appropriate response to judicial review within a constitutional 
dispensation, Hoexter contends that the judiciary must display:40 
A willingness to appreciate the legitimate and constitutionally-ordained province of 
administrative agencies; to admit the expertise of those agencies in policy-laden or 
polycentric issues; to accord their interpretations of fact and law due respect and to 
be sensitive in general to the interests legitimately pursued by administrative bodies 
and the practical and financial constraints under which they operate. 
Hoexter contends that these considerations permit the adoption of a concept of 
deference, which is consistent with the concern for individual rights and a refusal to 
tolerate corruption and maladministration. She states that because of the wide powers 
                                        
37  Chayes 1976 Harv L Rev 1308. 
38  Section 2 of the Constitution, which states that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic, 
law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled. 
39  Chapter 3 of the Constitution. 
40  Hoexter 2000 SALJ 501. 
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conferred on the courts to review executive and legislative actions, it is essential that 
courts justify their intervention or non-intervention. It is also important that this be 
done candidly and consciously rather in a formalistic or coded style.41 The culture of 
deference has been increasingly employed by South African courts.42 
O'Regan argues that an important aspect of the South African doctrine of separation 
of powers is that the separation between judicial, legislative and executive powers 
contains a structural and functional distinction between the arms of government 
which, in order to preserve their institutional integrity and their democratic function, 
need to be preserved from intrusion.43  
In Speaker of the National Assembly v De Lille,44 the Court noted that the constitutional 
order requires courts to intervene to protect fundamental rights. Accordingly, the 
principle of non-interference with the affairs of another branch of government, an 
important aspect of the doctrine of separation of powers, must give way to the need 
to provide protection for the individual rights which lie at the heart of our democratic 
order. O'Regan states that it is clear from the court's jurisprudence that the principle 
of non-intrusion, although qualified, is an important aspect of our doctrine of 
separation of powers.45 Although this doctrine is an important aspect of the South 
African constitutional state, this statement disregards the fact that the Constitutional 
Court is the ultimate forum for decision-making in all constitutional matters.46 The 
courts are constitutionally mandated to uphold the provisions and values of the 
Constitution and to declare laws and conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution 
invalid.47 Therefore, when "intruding" at a legitimate time and in a legitimate manner 
the courts are performing their function in respect of the separation of powers. 
                                        
41  Hoexter Administrative Law 138. 
42  Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson 2003 2 SA 460 (SCA) paras 20–21; Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd 2003 6 SA 407 (SCA). 
43  O'Regan 2005 PER/PELJ 131. 
44  Speaker of the National Assembly v De Lille 1999 4 All SA 241 (A). 
45  O'Regan 2005 PER/PELJ 132. 
46  Section 167(3)(a) of the Constitution. 
47  Section 2 of the Constitution. 
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Consequently, the principle of non-intrusion or deference cannot be justified by 
reliance on the doctrine of the separation of powers alone.  
In Premier of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of State-aided Schools, Eastern 
Transvaal48 the Court held that:49 
In determining what constitutes procedural fairness in a given case, a court should 
be slow to impose obligations upon government, which will inhibit its ability to make 
and implement policy effectively (a principle well recognised in the common law and 
that of other countries). As a young democracy facing immense challenges of 
transformation, we cannot deny the importance of the need to ensure the ability of 
the executive to act efficiently and promptly. 
The Court thus recognises the importance of allowing the executive to carry out its 
functions without undue hindrance. The Court reasoned as follows: 
In treating the decisions of administrative agencies with the appropriate respect, a 
court is recognising the proper role of the executive within the Constitution. In doing 
so, a court should be careful not to attribute to itself superior wisdom in relation to 
matters entrusted to other branches of government. A court should thus give due 
weight to findings of fact and policy decisions made by those with special expertise 
and experience in the field.  
The extent to which a court should give weight to these considerations will depend 
upon the character of the decision itself, as well as on the identity of the decision-
maker. A decision that requires an equilibrium to be struck between a range of 
competing interests or considerations and which is to be taken by a person or 
institution with specific expertise in that area must be shown respect by the courts. 
This does not mean however that where the decision is one which a will not 
reasonably result in the achievement of the goal, or which is not reasonably 
supported on the facts or not reasonable in the light of the reasons given for it, a 
court may not review that decision. A court should not rubber-stamp an unreasonable 
decision simply because of the complexity of the decision or the identity of the 
decision-maker. 
There can be no doubt that the executive and legislative branches must be accorded 
their proper role in terms of the Constitution. However, the Constitution does not limit 
the roles and powers of state organs. The Constitution defines the roles and powers 
of all role-players within the constitutional state. Judicial review that is based on the 
objectives, obligations and values gleaned from the constitutional text does not intrude 
                                        
48  Premier of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of State-aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 2 
SA 91 (CC). 
49  Premier of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of State-aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 2 
SA 91 (CC) para 51. 
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within the sphere of other government departments. Judicial review ensures that the 
roles and powers of state institutions are exercised as defined by the Constitution. 
4 Judicial review and a culture of justification 
Mureinik wrote: "The principles of judicial review represent the core of the judicial 
conception of justice."50 Mureinik articulated the following principles that are 
considered fundamental for judicial review:51 
1 The principle that policy should be implemented in a reasonable or non-
discriminatory fashion. 
2 The principle that someone whose rights are affected by an official decision has 
a right to be heard before that decision is made. 
3 The principle that, when a statute says that an official must have reason to 
believe that x is the case before he acts, the court should require that reasons 
be produced sufficient to justify that belief. 
4 The principle that no executive decision can encroach on a fundamental right 
unless the empowering statute specifically authorises that encroachment. 
5 The principle that regulations made under discretionary powers (for example, 
the power to make regulations declaring and dealing with a state of emergency) 
must be capable of being defended in a court of law by a demonstration that 
there are genuine circumstances of the kind which justify invoking the power 
and that the powers actually invoked are demonstrably related to the purpose 
of the empowering statute. 
If the above principles are analysed, it becomes clear that he argues for a policy of 
non-discrimination, openness, justification, accountability and participation. A person 
whose rights are affected must be given an opportunity to be heard, reasons must be 
given for decisions, and the decisions must be based on and related to an empowering 
statute.  
                                        
50  Mureinik 1986 SALJ 617. 
51  Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 18. 
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Dyzenhaus proposes three separate approaches to the problem of the judicial role in 
reviewing decisions of the administration:52 
1. Law as authority: the law reflects the preferences of the majority of society as 
developed through the medium of a democratically-elected legislature; 
2. Law as a culture of neutrality, which seeks to protect a range of individual rights 
from interference by the state. Statutes that infringe on the individual's right to 
decide how to live, for example, are illegitimate; they offend against public 
reason, the custodians of which are the judges;53 and 
3. Law as a culture of justification, which seeks to promote the idea that parties 
are entitled to participate in decisions which affect them, that is, decisions 
which determine their rights, and further, that the decisions of organs of state 
must be justified by the decision-maker within the public discourse fashioned 
by the Constitution, thereby rendering the decision-maker accountable to the 
public he serves. 
The third approach proposed by Dyzenhaus corresponds with the fundamental 
principles articulated by Mureinik. Law as a culture of justification resonates with the 
constitutional values of accountability, participation, justification and openness. 
Davis writes that the concept of deference is employed by the courts to promote 
certain basic principles, namely:54 
1 South Africa is committed to transformation and to meeting the needs of the 
poor, hence government and its administrations are of critical importance;  
2  Often, the substance of decisions made by government agencies is not 
appropriate to judicial decision-making, particularly because of the poly-
centricity of task and consequence; and  
3 The government official/agency is an expert or at least more of an expert than 
the court deciding the issue in question. 
                                        
52  Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 11. 
53  Davis 2006 Acta Juridica 29. 
54  Davis 2006 Acta Juridica 26. 
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When analysing the principles promoted by the Court's reliance on the notion of 
deference, there is no provision for the realisation of the values and objectives 
enshrined in the Constitution. The only value addressed is the principle of 
transformation. The principles promoted by reliance on the theory of deference allow 
the courts to abdicate their duty to apply the Constitution without fear, favour or 
prejudice.55 
The principles listed by Davis are clearly illustrated by the finding of the Court in Bato 
Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs.56 The question was raised 
as to the extent to which an executive decision is susceptible for review under the 
constitutional order. The Court employed the following test to determine whether the 
decision was reviewable:57 
If we are satisfied that the Chief Director did take into account all the factors, struck 
a reasonable equilibrium between them and selected reasonable means to pursue 
the identified legislative goal in the light of the facts before him, the applicant cannot 
succeed. The task of allocation of fishing quotas is a difficult one, intimately 
connected with complex policy decisions and requires on-going supervision and 
management of that process by the departmental decision-makers who are experts 
in the field. 
Ngcobo J formulated an approach of judicial review by way of the constitutional 
framework within which all decisions of state organs need to be assessed. He 
commenced his judgment by referring to the transformative objectives of the 
Constitution.58 He then emphasised that a foundational principle of the Act is the 
transformation of the fishing industry. Ngcobo J concluded that, if the Minister were 
to fail to heed the transformative considerations enshrined in the Act, "he would be 
acting unlawfully and his decision would be open to attack".59 The duty of the courts, 
however, does not extend to telling the functionaries how to implement the 
transformation. That must be left to the functionaries concerned.60  
                                        
55  Section 165(2) of the Constitution. 
56  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 48. 
57  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 48. 
58  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 69. 
59  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 85. 
60  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 104. 
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Therefore, although Ngobo J sets a standard to which the executive must aspire; the 
attainment of the transformation of the fishing industry, the Court deferred to the 
executive on how to achieve this goal. This approach is incorrect. The Justice seems 
to be satisfied with the fact that the issue of transformation is addressed by the 
executive. Accordingly, the law can now be seen as a more or less "closed" normative 
system with no further input required from the Constitution. That is, with respect, a 
formalistic interpretation. At the heart of the Constitution is a commitment to 
substantive reasoning, to examining the underlying principles that inform laws 
themselves and judicial reaction to those laws.61 The courts do not need to tell the 
executive how to implement policy. What is needed is for the courts to ensure that 
the founding values of the Constitution are entertained by the executive when forming 
and implementing the policy. By enquiring whether the values of non-discrimination, 
accountability, participation, responsiveness and openness are addressed, the courts 
can explore the substantive justice of the law or policy. 
In ascribing to the deference of the courts to other branches of government, O'Regan 
J stated as follows: 
In treating the decisions of administrative agencies with the appropriate respect, a 
court is recognising the proper role of the executive within the Constitution. In doing 
so, a court should be careful not to attribute to itself superior wisdom in relation to 
matters entrusted to other branches of government. 
This approach by the Justice creates the impression that the courts go to great lengths 
to defer to the other organs of state, thus subscribing to a minimalist approach of 
constitutional interpretation. The Justice does not clarify where the self-imposed 
constraint emanates from. Is it gleaned from the text of the Constitution or are the 
courts deferring to the will of the more "democratic" organs of state? The Constitution 
subscribes to the principle of co-operative government62 and states that spheres of 
government should respect one another63 and not assume any power or function 
except those conferred by the Constitution,64 and the Constitution is the supreme 
                                        
61  Langa 2006 Stell LR 357. 
62  Chapter 3 of the Constitution. 
63  Section 41(1)(e) of the Constitution. 
64  Section 41(1)(f) of the Constitution. 
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law.65 Therefore, the constitutional obligations to apply the Constitution impartially 
and without fear, favour or prejudice,66 impel the courts to intervene in the actions of 
other organs of state, should constitutional violations occur. The duty of the courts to 
uphold the Constitution does not call for a minimalist approach to constitutional 
interpretation. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court rejected the majoritarian 
approach to constitutional interpretation from its inception.67 
Davis also criticises the dictum by the Justice:68 
This dictum appears to be more concerned with judicial restraint than with the 
construction of a coherent concept of deference that might serve as a guide to a 
court, which seeks to mediate between law and the implementation of legislative and 
executive politics. 
He continues by citing from para 42 of the Bato Star Fishing case, where the court 
argues: 
This does not mean however that where the decision is one which will not reasonably 
result in the achievement of the goal, or which is not supported on the facts or not 
reasonable in the light of the reasons given for it, a court may not review that 
decision. A court should not rubber stamp an unreasonable decision simply because 
of the complexity of the decision or the identity of the decision-maker. 
According to Davis, this illustrates an "absence of a coherent theory of review in a 
constitutional context". Justice O'Regan's judgment turns on the deference owed to 
the expertise of the department charged with the decision to allocate fishing quotas, 
and Justice Ncobo bowed to transformational prominence and the fact that 
"functionaries" should be given the scope to implement these objectives.69 
Davis is rightly critical of both judgments and states that it is bizarre that the full bench 
concurred with both:70 
                                        
65  Section 2 of the Constitution. 
66  Section 165(2) of the Constitution. 
67  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 87, where the Court held that what the majority of 
South Africans believe a proper sentence for murder should be is irrelevant. It is whether the 
Constitution allows the sentence. Public opinion therefore may have some relevance but it is no 
substitute for the duty vested in the courts to interpret the Constitution and to uphold its provisions 
without fear or favour. 
68  Davis 2006 Acta Juridica 26. 
69  Davis 2006 Acta Juridica 26. 
70  Davis 2006 Acta Juridica 28. 
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One judgment is, at best, committed to respect for the principle of separation of 
powers. The other judgment appears to nudge the legal community to accept that 
an interrogation of constitutional values rather than a conflation of a contested 
concept of institutional competence with the principle of separation of powers must 
be the key guideline for review of administrative decisions. But, as it is about to take 
the conclusive step, it falters into line with the judgment of O'Regan J. The coherent 
theory of review in the constitutional era appears as much an illusion as the 
respondent department's commitment to transformation! 
Davis proposes a culture of justification for judicial review that takes into account the 
democratic prerogative of the elected arms of government to fashion and implement 
public policy within the framework of the Constitution. This culture accepts that the 
role of judicial review is to foster a culture of democracy, and that the judiciary must 
commence from a standpoint that it operates within a governmental system that is 
based upon a doctrine of the separation of powers.71 Davis suggests that judges have 
to interpret their own role in a constitutional democracy, not only about unlocking the 
big constitutional conundrums, but also about the manner in which they go about the 
business of the review of the administration.72 He argues that: 
If the model of government is based on the idea of participation by citizens in 
decisions which affect them, the right to express views about any decision which an 
administrative agency is about to take which may determine a right of a citizen needs 
to be robustly protected, as would the right to reasons for any such decision and the 
corollary thereto, the provision of all reasonable means to participate in the decision-
making process. The principle of separation of powers should not be allowed to 
undermine these rights of participation; in other words, deference should usually not 
play a significant role in the formulation of the scope and content of these procedural 
rights. 
Although Davis's work is meant only as a framework for a coherent theory of judicial 
review, the question of justification and participation advances other constitutional 
values such as openness, non-discrimination, accountability and participation to 
judicial scrutiny. This culture of justification meets the tenets of judicial review as set 
out by both Mureinik and Dyzenhaus and finds application in an objective 
interpretation of constitutional provisions and values. The culture of justification 
ensures that the government justifies its decisions to the governed; it promotes 
transparent government and allows the citizens to participate in decisions affecting 
                                        
71  Davis 2006 Acta Juridica 28. 
72  Davis 2006 Acta Juridica 30. 
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them. Although deference may have been the correct approach for the Constitutional 
Court at its inception, the Court and the Constitution are now permanent facets of the 
South African State. Therefore:73 
A group of judges collectively committed to the ideal of adjudication according to the 
law might disregard the political constraints impacting on their decisions without any 
conscious appreciation of their decisions on their court's capacity to withstand 
political attack.  
The Constitution sets the values against which executive and legislative action must 
be tested. The inherent values of openness, justification, participation and 
accountability that form the basis of the South African Constitution are not realised 
when the courts subscribe to a policy of deference. The culture of justification allows 
the courts to test executive and legislative action against the foundational values of 
the Constitution and finds the correct balance in the application of the principle of 
separation of powers. 
In Helen Suzman Foundation v President of the Republic of South Africa74 the Court 
found:75 
Separation of powers requires that the Judiciary refrain from being unnecessarily 
prescriptive to both the Executive and Parliament on the kind of institutionally 
independent body required to stem the tide of corruption in this country. The 
constitutionally compliant policy choices they make must be respected, even if there 
are, in the opinion of the Judiciary, better options available. 
The Chief Justice concludes: 
Ours is to ensure that the constitutional requirements for a functional and efficient 
corruption-busting machinery have been met and nothing more or less. 
The statement by the Chief Justice suggests that the South African Police Service 
Amendment Act76 and the South African Police Service Act77 have exhausted normative 
and policy considerations and that accordingly the laws could be seen as "closed" 
normative systems. This formalistic logic does not satisfy constitutional values, which 
                                        
73  Roux Politics of Principle 95. 
74  Helen Suzman Foundation v President of the RSA 2015 2 SA 1 (CC). 
75  Helen Suzman Foundation v President of the RSA 2015 2 SA 1 (CC) para 75. 
76  South African Police Service Amendment Act 10 of 2012. 
77  South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995. 
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are not a closed-set of logically organised rules. A formalistic approach to 
constitutional interpretation proposes that the substantive justice of the law under 
constitutional scrutiny is irrelevant. Such an interpretation runs counter to the 
founding values of the Constitution. 
The culture of deference that the Constitutional Court subscribes to increasingly looks 
like judicial restraint.78 The American author Dworkin rejects judicial restraint because 
judicial review exists to protect minorities against the oppression of the majority and 
judges should not defer to the will of the legislature. Courts must instead interpret 
constitutional rights according to the demands of precedent and integrity. Dworkin is 
also sceptical about the seriousness with which the legislature takes its responsibility 
to interpret the Constitution faithfully and to act in accordance with that interpretation. 
He distrusts elected officials, believing that they are likely, due to electoral pressure, 
to ignore the Constitution and to take the side of the majority against the minority.79  
Dworkin's view has relevance in the South African constitutional state for two reasons. 
Firstly, because of the "fused" nature of the South African legislature/executive80 and 
the overconcentration of the power of the ANC in state institutions.81 The second 
reason relates to the ANC's subscription to majoritarianism.82 Moreover, the demands 
of precedent and integrity, as argued for by Dworkin, can be met by relying on the 
inherent values of openness, justification, participation and accountability that form 
the basis of the South African Constitution. 
5 Public litigation and the culture of deference 
Due to the influence of Dicey, parliamentary systems have a deep distrust of any 
supervisory role by the courts over the administration. For Dicey, all exercise of public 
power was to be channelled through Parliament, as Parliament reflects the will of the 
people and hence is the appropriate mechanism within a democratic state to exercise 
                                        
78  Davis 2006 Acta Juridica 26. 
79  Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here? 134. 
80  O'Regan 2005 PER/PELJ 125, Labuschagne Funksionele en Strukturele Ontleding 218. 
81  Devenish 2003 THRHR 89; Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer 2001 Democratization 44-45, Malan 
2014 PER/PELJ 1968-1969. 
82  Hulme and Peté 2012 PER/PELJ 55. 
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such an oversight role.83 This distrust is still evident in South Africa with its hybrid 
parliamentary form of government, and coincides with the Marxist attitude of the 
executive, shared by many of the ANC majority in Parliament and the Cabinet.84 Davis 
states that in a constitutional democracy the principle of accountability means that 
decisions of the administrative agencies must be accountable to constitutional 
provisions and values and must mean more than the right to be informed about 
decisions. This principle must be true to a concept of "public interest" which is defined 
by constitutional values.85  
The strength of the executive means that it increasingly displays an unwillingness to 
engage with the courts through judicial proceedings86 by ignoring the process87 or 
through questioning the final judgment.88 In Minister of Home Affairs v Somali 
Association of South Africa Eastern Cape,89 the Minister failed to adhere to a court 
order instructing the state to reopen a refugee reception office. The Court stated that 
it is a most dangerous thing for a litigant, particularly a State department and senior 
officials in its employ, to wilfully ignore an order of court.90 The Court found that:91 
The cornerstone of democracy and the rule of law is the uncompromising duty and 
obligation upon all persons, more especially State departments, to obey and comply 
with court orders. There are processes in place for those who disagree with court 
orders. But they are not free to simply turn a blind eye to the order nor do they have 
any discretion to not obey the order. 
The Court found that no democracy could survive if court orders can be shunned and 
trampled on as happened in this matter and that there is a likelihood of a future 
                                        
83  Davis 2006 Acta Juridica 24. 
84  The ANC's political character allows it to align with groupings to the left or right with centralists 
continuing to hold the balance of power in the organisation. The ANC's commitment to 
constitutionalism is fragile and depends on the perceived public perception of the benefits of the 
negotiated settlement. Roux Politics of Principle 154, 160. 
85  Davis 2006 Acta Juridica 31. 
86  McLean Constitutional Deference 208. 
87  Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 
(CC), where the executive failed to respond to the court's direction. 
88  The Minister of Health stated that she would ignore the court order handed down in Minister of 
Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). 
89  Minister of Home Affairs v Somali Association of South Africa Eastern Cape 2015 3 SA 545 (SCA). 
90  Minister of Home Affairs v Somali Association of South Africa Eastern Cape 2015 3 SA 545 (SCA) 
para 35. 
91  Minister of Home Affairs v Somali Association of South Africa Eastern Cape 2015 3 SA 545 (SCA) 
para 33. 
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repetition of similar conduct on the part of the relevant authorities.92 
Lenta writes that the political majority enjoyed by the ANC may tempt the government 
to not always act in a way that furthers the common good, but rather in a way that 
prioritises the government's and its supporters' interests over considerations of 
justice.93 It is imperative that judicial review is structured in such a manner that state 
action is kept within the bounds of the Constitution. Venter posits that the justification 
for constitutional review should rather be sought in the need for the qualification of 
blind popular majoritarianism with rational judicial argument.94 The principle of 
deference is not an effective qualification of the concept of majoritarianism. In fact, 
the principle of deference subscribes to a majoritarian vision of democracy by 
countenancing a "superior role" for the legislature and executive in lieu of the courts. 
Venter argues as follows:95 
Where the Court orders the state "to take measures to meet its constitutional 
obligations" and subjects the reasonableness of government conduct to evaluation, 
it can by definition not be a meek and inhibited role. The Court has made it patently 
clear that, in terms of the powers granted it by the Constitution, it primarily lies within 
its domain to determine what is consistent with the Constitution and what not.  
Although this statement was made concerning judgments relating to socio-economic 
rights, there is no reason why a more expansive, uniform theory of constitutional 
review cannot be implemented by the courts. Davis argues: "The courts should ascribe 
to a more expansive theory of judicial review which would embrace the values and 
objectives which are quarried from the constitutional text."96 This expansive theory 
should allow for the promotion of the principles of participation and accountability in 
governance, an important step towards the attainment of transparent and accountable 
government. 
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93  Lenta 2004 SAJHR 30. 
94  Venter 2005 ZaöRV 145. 
95  Venter 2005 ZaöRV 158-159. 
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The dominance of the executive over Parliament means that at all three levels of 
government there are few effective checks and balances on the abuse of power by 
the executive. The deployment policy of the ANC calls for the placement of cadres in 
key positions in government and the public sector with the aim of bringing these 
institutions under its control.97  
McLean states that this means that the traditional separation of powers between the 
three branches of government is effectively found only between the courts on the one 
hand and the executive and legislature on the other. In the absence of robust checks 
and balances elsewhere, courts should respond, not by adopting a deferential position, 
but by ensuring that the other branches of government are held accountable to it and 
the Constitution.98 The benefits of public litigation show that it can be an effective 
check on the power of the legislative and executive branches but only if a more 
coherent and inclusive form of judicial review is embraced by the courts. This theory 
of judicial review should embrace the founding values of the Constitution. 
It is suggested that it is time for a change of direction by the Constitutional Court, as 
the Court could not be said to have achieved the degree of institutional independence 
characteristic of a court in a mature democracy.99 Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng 
accused the executive of interfering with the judiciary's independence and said that 
the judiciary needed to take collective responsibility and do things differently.100 He 
stated that: 
We ought to be worried when there is instability or a measure of instability in the 
executive and in the legislative arm of government. But we ought to be terrified and 
deeply concerned when the judiciary does not appear to be what it was established 
to be. When there is a possibility, no matter how remote that the judiciary might be 
                                        
97  Roux Politics of Principle 181. 
98  McLean Constitutional Deference 209. 
99  Roux Politics of Principle 391. 
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manipulated, then we have to be vigilant. Without an independent judiciary, 
democracy is doomed. 
It is submitted that such a change in direction could be achieved by discarding the 
out-dated principle of deference and subscribing to a policy of judicial review based 
on the founding values of the Constitution; openness of government, justification of 
decisions by those in power, and the right to participation by those affected by the 
decision. Judicial review based on a culture of justification will allow for decisions by 
organs of state to be justified by the decision-maker within the public discourse 
fashioned by the Constitution, thereby rendering the decision-maker accountable to 
the public he serves.101 
The culture of "justification" approach as proposed by Davis finds the correct balance 
for judicial review in both an objective interpretation of constitutional provisions and 
the values inherent in the Constitution and offers a workable concept for the doctrine 
of the separation of powers.  
South Africa subscribes to a democratic style of government based on accountability, 
responsiveness and openness.102 When executive and legislative action is tested 
through litigation against a culture of justification, it allows these values to be explored 
and realised. This will allow for the opportunity for systemic change to the South 
African constitutional landscape based on the principles and values of the Constitution. 
The Constitution does not call on judges to be passive administrators of justice. in the 
circumstances in which the South African constitutional state currently operates, 
where multiparty democracy comes under pressure, non-majoritarian constitutional 
review is essential for the survival of constitutionalism.103 As stated by Venter: "Strong 
and fearless judicial consistency is needed as a corrective to majoritarian arrogance 
rather than judicial echoes of government policy and ideology".104  
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